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STANLEY v. ILLINOIS:
WHAT IT PORTENDS FOR ADOPTIONS IN MONTANA
Karen Townsend
INTRODUCTION
Until very recently, the putative father was ignored in most stale
proceedings affecting his child, including adoption proceedings which
permanently terminate his parental rights.' Twelve states 2 require his
consent to the adoption of his child, while the remainder do not.3 The
1972 Stanley v. Illinois4 decision, invalidating an Illinois statute which
failed to provide a hearing for an unwed father prior to denying him
custody of his children upon the death of their mother, signaled an end
to this treatment. With this recognition by the Court of a putative
father's constitutional interest in his child, adoption statutes ignoring
this interest are called into question. 5
This note will examine the Stanley decision and cases which followed it, will consider the present Montana adoption statutes and procedures, and will discuss a proposal which will bring them into harmony
with Stanley's requirements. 6
STANLEY V. ILLINOIS AND ITS AFTERMATH
The Stanley decision concerned Peter Stanley and his fight for
two of his three children. Peter had lived off and on with Joan
Stanley for eighteen years, and all three children were born of this
relationship. 7 Because Peter and Joan were unmarried, Peter was not
considered a "parent" under Illinois law.8 Upon the death of Joan

'See generally Reeves, Benjamin, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After Stan-

ley v. Illinois: Problems in Implementation, 13 J. FAM. L. 115 (1973).
'Id. at 138-139. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, Nevada, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Utah have made some provision
for the putative father's consent through statutory or case law.
1id. at 139-141. Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
4Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
'Note, The "Strange Boundaries" of Stanley: Providing Notice of Adoption to the
Unknown Putative Father, 59 VA. L. REV. 517, 518 (1973).
'Various commentators have thoroughly examined other rights of the putative father
under current state law. See generally Embick, The Illegitimate Father, 3 J. FAM. L.
321 (1963); Tabler, Paternal Rights in the Illegitimate Child: Some Legitimate complaints on Behalf of the Unwed Father, 11 J. FAM. L. 231 (1971); Note, Father of
an Illegitimate Child-His Right to Be Heard, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1071 (1966) ; Note,
Domestic Relations-Putative Father's Right to Custody of His Child, 1971 Wis. L.
REV. 1262; Comment, The Emerging Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's
Parental Rights, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1581 (1972).
'Stanley v. Illinois, supra note 4 at 646.
'ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-14 (Smith-Hurd--1972).
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Stanley, the children were considered to be without any living parent
so a dependency proceeding was instituted by the State of Illinois. As
a result, the children were declared wards of the state and placed with
court appointed guardians. Peter Stanley appealed claiming that since
Illinois law required a hearing to determine fitness as a parent for married fathers and mothers and for unmarried mothers before children
could be declared wards of the state, failure to provide such a hearing
for him was a denial of equal protection as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
The Court held that:
as a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a hearing
on his fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him
and that, by denying him a hearing and extending it to all other

parents whose custody of their children is challenged, the State
denied Stanley the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment."
It is not yet clear how broadly or narrowly the Stanley decision
should be read." Some clues, however, are given by later cases. In the
same term as the Stanley decision, the Supreme Court acted in two other
cases which involved the rights of putative fathers in disputes over
their children.2 The Court vacated the judgment and remanded each
to the state court for reconsideration "in light of Stanley v. Illinois."'"
One of these two cases, Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, also arose in Illinois. In the Vanderlaan case, the plaintiff mother petitioned the Illinois
court to modify the custody provisions of a divorce decree awarding
custody to the defendant father. The couple had been divorced after
five years of marriage and had one child. Following the divorce, two
more children were born to the plaintiff. A court found defendant to
be the father of both children, and ordered him to make support payments. Five years later, upon petition of the defendant, the court
awarded custody of all three children to the father. The present action
was instituted by the plaintiff to regain custody. The Illinois court
looked to the public policy behind the Illinois Paternity Act and held
that the Illinois legislature had determined that "'a putative father
should have no right to the society' of his children born out of wed-

OStanley v. Illinois, supra note 4 at 646.
'OId. at 649.
"The dissent of Mr. Chief Justice Burger in the Stanley case warned of the possible
"cstrange boundaries" which might be encountered. Id. at 668. Various commentators
have explored these limits. See generally Reeves, supra note 1; Note, The "Strange
Boundaries" of Stanley: Providing Notice of Adoption to the Putative Father, supra
note 5; Rick, Plight of the Putative Father in California Child Custody Proceedings:
A Problem in Equal Protection, 6 U.C.D. L. REv. 1 (1973); Belvel, Custody Rights of
Unwed Fathers, 4 PAC. L. J. 922 (1973); Bazos, Constitutional Law-Due Process
and Equal Protection-ClassificationsBased on Illegitimacy, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 908.
"State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 240, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970),
vacated sub. nom., Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972);
Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 126 Ill. App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 717 (1970), vacated and
consolidated, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
Id.
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lock."'1 4 Such a holding is difficult to reconcile with any interpretation
of Stanley.
The second case, Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, 15 involved
an adoption proceeding. The putative father had petitioned the court
for a writ of habeas corpus to determine who had the right to legal
custody of John Thomas Lewis, a minor. The child had been born to
Karen Ann Lewis, whose parental rights had been terminated with her
consent one week after his birth. The child had subsequently been placed
for adoption. Like the statute in the Stanley case, the Wisconsin law
did not include unwed fathers within the meaning of the word parent.
The court concluded that:
the putative father of a child born out of wedlock does not have any
parental rights; and that the failure of the Wisconsin statutes to
grant parental rights or notice of a hearing to a putative father
prior to termination of parental rights does not constitute a violation of the state or federal constitution.'
The remand of each of these cases "in light of Stanley"'17 does not
provide precise boundaries for the extent of the Stanley decision.' 8 However, Stanley suggests at the very least that the putative 19 father is
entitled to notice of pending state proceedings, and a hearing if he so
requests one.
RECENT ACTION IN OTHER STATES
Following the decision in Stanley, Vanderlaan, and Rothstein, the
Illinois supreme court was asked to rule again on the right of a putative
father in People ex rel. Slavek v. Covenant Children'sHome.20 The court
held that the Illinois Adoption Act, which precluded the father of an
illegitimate child from asserting any right to that child in adoption
proceedings was unconstitutional. 21 The Illinois Attorney General later
issued an opinion 22 on Stanley stating that consent to an adoption must
be obtained from the unwed father, or if he is unknown, that he be
made a party defendant in the proceeding. Illinois agencies have interpreted Stanley as requiring that all unwed fathers be provided notice
23
and an opportunity to participate.

I4Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, supra note 12 at 720.
" Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, supra note 12.
16Id.

"'See, treatment of cases, supra note 12.
"See generally, cases, supra note 11.
,'Putative father" is used in this note to refer to the father of an illegitimate child
whose identity is known and who has acknowledged paternity. The term "unwed
father'' is used to refer to an illegitimate child's father whose identity may or may
not be known. This distinction was used by Reeves, supra note 1.
"People ex rel. Slavek v. Covenant Children's Home, 50 Ill.2d 20, 284 N.E.2d 291
(1972).

21Id. at 292.
'Reeves, supra note 1 citing 61 ILL. BAR J. 378, 379 (1973), citing Op. ATT'Y GEN.
543 (1972).
1d. n. 1 at 132.
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A New York court has also examined the question. In its decision
in Doe v. Department of Social Services, 24 the court held that the putative
father had a "substantial and cognizable interest" in the proposed adoption of his illegitimate child and had status to oppose the adoption. 25
In looking at the New York adoption law26 which required only the
mother's consent to adoption where the child was born out of wedlock,
the court said that the statute:
must be so construed that the mother's exclusive or sole consent

suffices only where there has been no formal or unequivocal acknowledgment or recognition of paternity by the father. It is not that the
father's consent is now necessary as a condition precedent to adop-

tion, but rather that he be served with "notice" ergo, according the
father an opportunity, if he is so advised, to present facts for the
court's consideration in determining what is in the best interests of
the child.'
Such a holding suggests that adoption statutes which require only
a mother's consent in adoptions of illegitimate children may be allowed
to stand after Stanley if they are interpreted to require notice to and a
hearing, if requested, for a putative father who had unequivocally acknowledged his paternity.
At least three other states28 have revised their adoption laws to give
some recognition to the putative father's rights in response to the
Stanley decision.
THE LAW IN MONTANA
Adoption in Montana is governed by Title 61, chapter 2, Revised
Codes of Montana, 1947.29 Generally the statute requires that both parents consent to the adoption of a legitimate child, while the mother's

consent alone is sufficient in the case of an illegitimate child.3 0 No change
has been made since the Stanley decision.
Although the Illinois Attorney General has found his state's adoption procedure, requires the procurement of the father's consent in all
adoptions, in order to comply with Stanley,3 1 counsel to the Department
of Social and Rehabilitation Service (S.R.S. is the state department which
oversees the adoption activities of all county welfare offices) has not

2Doe v. Department of Social Services, 71 Misc. 2d 666, 337 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1972).
mId. at 106.
"N.Y. Dom. REL. § 111(3) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
'Doe v. Department of Social Services, supra note 24 at 107.
"Michigan, MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 710.3a (Supp. 1973); Colorado, CoLo. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 22-1-3, 22-1-4 (Senate Bill No. 315, 1973); South Dakota, S.D. COmPILED LAWS ANN. § 25-6-4 (Supp. 1973); A detailed analysis of the Michigan statute
is given in Reeves, supra note 1 at 132-133 and Note, supra note 5 at 527-531. These
statutes take the same general approach as H.B. 637 set out in note 44, infra.
"9REVISED CODES Or MONTANA, §§ 61-201-61-218 (1947)
[hereinafter cited as R.C.M.
1947].
-R.C.M. 1947, § 61-205.
$Reeves, supra note 22.
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issued any new guidelines in light of the Stanley decision. 32 However,
the procedure presently followed by county welfare departments can
make allowances for the putative father. Briefly, the procedure followed by the welfare departments is as follows. First, the department
institutes a hearing to have the child declared dependant, then the
parental rights of each parent are terminated and legal custody with
the right to consent to adoption is given to the welfare department, and
finally the department consents to the child's adoption in a subsequent
83
action.
Although such a procedure and its interpretation by S.R.S. offers
some protection to the rights of the putative father in Montana, not
all adoptions are carried out in this way. Therefore, it is necessary to
see whether the statutory requirements which must be met by an adoption not handled by S.R.S. need additional safeguards. Since the statutory requirements provide for the mother's sole consent in the case of
an illegitimate child, that protection must be found elsewhere. There
are two possible alternatives. One is a statutory interpretation such as
that suggested in Doe v. Department of Social Service. The other is a
statutory change, the approach taken by Colorado, Michigan and South
Dakota. Statutory change offers a way of dealing with the problem
comprehensively.
THE KIND OF CHANGE MANDATED
In order to determine whether Stanley requires a substantial as opposed to a minor change in the state adoption statutes and procedures,
it is necessary to plot the boundaries of the Stanley decision. The Stanley
case, as well as the Rothstein and Vanderlaan decision which followed,
all involved putative fathers who had openly acknowledged paternity.
Because of this fact, it is possible to read Stanley's requirements in a
34
more restricted fashion than has Illinois.
Although footnote nine of the Stanley decision speaks of "offering
unwed fathers an opportunity for individualized hearings" '35 and thus
could be read to mandate notice to all unwed fathers, the body of the
opinion does not demand such an extensive reaction.

82Telephone call to Mr. Tom Mahan, counsel to Department of Social and Rehabilitation
Services [hereinafter called S.R.S.].
The procedures followed were outlined in Title 10, ch. 5, R.C.M. 1947. These statutes
were repealed by the 1974 legislature, Laws of Mont. 1974, ch. 328, § 13, and replaced
by R.C.M. 1947, Title 10, ch. 13. The basic procedure used by the departments did
not change, however. The Montana Supreme Court held in a 1964 case that the district court 's jurisdiction in such an action was conditional on the issuance of personal
notice to the child's father who was a resident of the county. In the Matter of
Georgia Arlene Young, 143 Mont. 230, 388 P.2d 379, 381 (1964). Mr. Mahan, S.R.S.
counsel, reported that this decision has been interpreted by his department as requiring notice to the putative father in a dependency hearing.
"4Reeves, supra note 22.
'Stanley v. Illinois, supra note 4 at 657.
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The Court identifies the two competing interests which it balances
in the Stanley opinion. On the one hand is the "private interest . . .of
a man in the children he has sired and raised .. . [an interest] in the
companionship, care, custody, and management in his children. ' 36 On
the other hand is the interest of the state in protecting "the moral,
emotional and physical welfare of the minor. '37 The Court's disapproval
of the State of Illinois procedure was not based on disagreement with
the fundamental interest or goal of the state, but the means employed
to achieve that goal. "We observe that the State registers no gain towards its declared goals when it separates children from the custody
of fit parents." 38
In order to remain compatible with the rest of the opinion, that
reference to "unwed fathers" in footnote nine cannot therefore be interpreted to refer to all unwed fathers. The very description of Peter Stanley's interest used by the Court implies more than a mere biological connection between father and child. Stanley had played an active role in
the lives of the contested children through contributions to their economic and psychological support.3 9 When such an interest is present,
Stanley holds that the state must follow procedures which will protect it.
If, however, that interest is not present, the state may choose its own
procedures to protect its interest in the welfare of the child. It cannot
be argued that the interest of the father who has given only genetic
information to his child is of the same magnitude as the interest of a
man who has "sired and raised his children. '40 It is therefore possible
to reject the notion that Stanley mandates a hearing for all unwed
fathers.
The Child-Welfare League, a policy setting organization for adoption agencies, suggests that a hearing be provided only for all fathers
' 41
who have "either acknowledged paternity or been so adjudicated."
42
Montana's adoption statutes do not meet this suggestion.
Montana
should, therefore, rework its adoption procedures to provide a hearing
for such a putative father so that its statutes could survive a challenge
based on Stanley.
86d. at 651.
MId. at 652.
s8Id.
'Id. at 666.
40Id. at 651.
01 THE CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE NEWSLETrER 6 (Fall-Winter 1972).
The League
formulated this suggestion following a meeting between members of the Child Welfare
League and representatives of the American Bar Association which took place in
October of 1972. The meeting was called to discuss the implications of the Stanley
decision.
"Some protection is afforded the putative father by the procedures followed by S.R.S.;
but without statutory change, any private adoption would not need to concern itself
with the putative father. At present three private agencies in Montana make arrangements for many adoptions: Catholic Charities, Lutheran Social Service, and Shodair
Children's Hospital. In addition, attorneys in private practice handle adoptions and
need follow only the statutory requirements for adoptions which do not provide for
hearings or notice to a putative father.
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TWO LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
There are at present two proposals circulating in the state for
43
changing the adoption laws to conform to Stanley. The first, H.B. 637,
was introduced in the 43rd Legislative Assembly. The bill set up provisions whereby a putative father was required to file a form acknowledging paternity within thirty days of the birth of his child in order to
preserve his rights in his child. 44 It is questionable whether such a procedure would have protected the rights of Peter Stanley. 45 Such a bill
would mean that a putative father's rights in his child would be totally
dependent on his performing the affirmative act of registering. Failure
to register would result in a waiver of his parental rights in his child.46
Although it is certainly possible to waive a right by failure to exercise
it, 47 it is questionable whether a putative father should have to register
in order to preserve the right to a hearing which determines his parental
rights. Such a hearing was ordered for Peter Stanley by the Court because of his ongoing relationship with his children, an interest the
Court recognized and protected without additional actions required of
him.
48
A second proposal, entitled the UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT,
43

H.B. 637 "AN ACT TO DEFINE THE RIGHTS OF A FATHER WITH RESPECT
TO HIS ILLEGITIMATE CHILD AND TO CLARIFY THE STATUS OF CERTAIN ADOPTION PROCEEDINGS INVOLVING ILLEGTIMATE CHILDREN,
AND AMENDING SECTIONS 61-108 AND 61-205, R.C.M. 1947, AND PROVIDING
AN EFFECTIVE DATE." This particular bill was introduced by Representative
Towe of Billings and passed the House but was defeated by the Senate. MONTANA
HOUSE JOURNAL 205 (1974); MONTANA SENATE JOURNAL 454 (1974).
"H.B. 637, § 3. "UNWED FATHERS, REGISTRATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS.
(1) THE FATHER OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD MAY ACKNOWLEDGE HIS
PATERNITY ON A FORM FURNISHED BY THE DIRECTOR OF SOCIAL AND
REHABILITATION SERVICES. A FATHER FILING HIS ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AS PRESCRIBED BY THIS SECTION PRESERVES HIS RIGHTS TO
CUSTODY OF THE CHILD AND TO CONSENT TO THE ADOPTION OF HIS
CHILD ....
(5) A PERSON WHO FAILS TO EXECUTE AND DELIVER A
FORM TO THE DIRECTOR AS PRESCRIBED IN THE PRECEDING SECTION
WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF THE BIRTH OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD
WAIVES THE RIGHTS TO ASSERT ANY PARENTAL RIGHTS RELATIVE
TO THAT CHILD, AND FURTHER WAIVES HIS RIGHT TO CONSENT TO
THE ADOPTION OF THE CHILD."
'Although the record indicates Peter Stanley lived on and off for eighteen years with
Joan Stanley and his three children and informally acknowledged his fatherhood,
there is no indication he had ever had his paternity recognized legally. Stanley v.
Illinois, supra note 4 at 666.
-H.B. 637, § 3 (5).
' Te.g., Shepard v. United States, 163 F.2d 974 (8th Cir. 1947); Petition of Duran, 152
Mont. 111, 448 P.2d 137 (1968).
"This particular act was drafted by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1973
as an attempt to deal with the Stanley v. Illinois decision. It was considered by the
Subcommittee on Judiciary along with fourteen other draft bills and resolutions for
implementing the equal rights provisions of the 1972 Montana Constitution. The subcommittee recommended that further study by the full Judiciary Committee be given
to this bill during the 1975 legislative session and did not recommend passage at this
time. Minutes of the Subcommittee on the Judiciary meeting of October 14, 1974,
state: "Although the subcommittee acknowledged that legislation repealing Montana's bastardy laws, providing for custody of illegitimate children, and regulating
support and custody of children conceived by artificial insemination was needed, the
members were disturbed by provisions of the act which would require the mother of
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provides for a two-step process for adoptions when a mother "relinquishes or proposes to relinquish a child for adoption. '49 First, a judicial
hearing is convened to determine whether parental rights of the father
should be terminated. 50 The notice provisions for this hearing require
the giving of personal notice to "an identified natural father" and
optional notice by publication for any "unknown father". 51 If the hearing terminates the father's rights, a legal guardian for the child is appointed who can be given the right to consent to adoption. If this right
is given to the guardian, his or her consent is sufficient for a legal
52
adoption.
CONCLUSION
The UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT's provisions on adoption are
similar to the procedures followed by county welfare agencies at the
present time.5 3 It offers a sound solution to the dilemma raised by
Stanley. The hearing provisions are adequate to meet Stanley's require54
ments and the provision for notice conforms to the Mullane doctrine.
The major advantage to this proposal, however, is that it provides
for the protection of the putative father's interest in his child while not
unduly hampering the adoption process. The Illinois approach of requiring father's consent in all adoptions, or making him a party defendant
and thus requiring notice, is an overreaction to Stanley which has substantially interferred with adoptions in that state and caused long delays
in child placement. 55 Such long delays are not "in the best interest of
the child"5 6 and need not occur if the UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT
or an act with similar provisions is adopted in Montana. It is quite clear

an illegitimate child to disclose the identity of the father of the child. Senator
Turnage moved that the bill be given to the Judiciary committee for further study
but without recommendation, with a specific request to study procedures for citation
and notification of the father. The motion was carried. Id. at 9.
'"UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, § 25.
5'UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, § 25-2c.
M
UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, § 25-6: "NOTICE OF THE PROCEEDING SHALL
BE GIVEN TO EVERY PERSON IDENTIFIED AS THE NATURAL FATHER
OR A POSSIBLE FATHER ....
IF NO PERSON HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED
AS THE NATURAL FATHER OR A POSSIBLE FATHER, THE COURT, ON
THE BASIS OF ALL INFORMATION AVAILABLE, SHALL DETERMINE
WHETHER PUBLICATION OR PUBLIC POSTING OF NOTICE OF THE PROCEEDING IS LIKELY TO LEAD TO IDENTIFICATION AND, IF SO, SHALL

ORDER PUBLICATION OR PUBLIC POSTING AT TIMES AND IN MANNER
IT DEEMS APPROPRIATE."
"UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, § 28-3.
'See discussion, supra note 32.
"Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). The
Mullane doctrine requires that notice be 'reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections."

"Reeves, supra note 1 at 132 n. 9.
'In re Bad Yellow Hair, ...... Mont .......

509 P.2d 9 (1973).

The Montana Supreme

Court reaffirmed in this most recent case the consistently applied standard that all

adoption and custody decisions must consider the "best interest of the child.''
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that Stanley does not permit a state to ignore the father's interest in
his child merely for administrative operating convenience.5 7 However,
it is equally clear that Stanley does not mandate that the interests of
the child in as rapid an adoption as possible be sacrificed while the
state seeks to notify an elusive or unknown father.

m7Stanley v. Illinois, supra note 4 at 656.
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